Redaxa · Privacy, before AI

Detection reference · Credentials and secrets · Updated 2026-11-03

Slack tokens (xoxb-, xoxp-, xapp-) and incoming webhook URLs

A Slack bot token can read and post wherever the bot is installed, and anyone holding an incoming webhook URL can post to its channel. Both have fixed shapes, so Redaxa can name them.

At a glance

Reported asAPI key or token
CategoryCredentials and secrets
Severitycritical: direct account or system compromise, as with keys, passwords and tokens
Replaced with[SECRET]
Where it runsThe same engine runs in the Chrome extension (free checks, on your device), in the web check and the Windows app (on Redaxa's server; the text is not stored) and in public repository checks.
Engine rulescanner.ts, line 205

What it looks like

xoxb-, xoxp-, xoxa-, xoxr-, xoxs- and xapp- followed by at least 10 letters, digits or hyphens; webhook URLs of the form https://hooks.slack.com/services/T…/B…/ plus a 24-character secret.

Example 1

You paste

SLACK_BOT_TOKEN=xoxb-RedaxaDocs-Sample-NotReal-Reda

Redaxa returns

SLACK_BOT_TOKEN=[SECRET]
Reported asAPI key or token
Severitycritical: direct account or system compromise, as with keys, passwords and tokens
Replaced with[SECRET]
Probable serviceSlack
Credential typeBot token
EvidenceSlack-specific prefix; workspace and scopes are not verified.
Recommended actionRevoke or rotate if genuine

Example 2

You paste

SLACK_APP_TOKEN=xapp-RedaxaDocs-Sample-NotReal-Reda

Redaxa returns

SLACK_APP_TOKEN=[SECRET]
Reported asAPI key or token
Severitycritical: direct account or system compromise, as with keys, passwords and tokens
Replaced with[SECRET]
Probable serviceSlack
Credential typeApp-level token
EvidenceSlack-specific prefix; workspace and scopes are not verified.
Recommended actionRevoke or rotate if genuine

Example 3

You paste

post to https://hooks.slack.com/services/T0REDAXA00/B0SAMPLE00/RedaxaDocsSampleNotRealR

Redaxa returns

post to [SECRET]
Reported asAPI key or token
Severitycritical: direct account or system compromise, as with keys, passwords and tokens
Replaced with[SECRET]
Probable serviceSlack
Credential typeIncoming webhook URL
EvidenceAnyone with this URL can post to its channel; workspace and channel are not verified.
Recommended actionRevoke or rotate if genuine

All values on this page are synthetic or published specimens; none is a working credential or a real person's data.

In a repository check

The same example, committed to a public repository and run through the free repository check:

Values are always shown masked in repository reports. No key is ever tested against its provider.

What it does not flag

If it already leaked

Revoke the token from the app's OAuth & Permissions page (or reinstall the app to issue new tokens). For a webhook, remove it from the app's Incoming Webhooks page and create a new one.

What Redaxa adds to every finding of this kind: If genuine, revoke or rotate it at the issuing service, update the application, then remove the exposed value from code and review Git history. Deleting it from Git does not revoke access.

Official guidance: docs.slack.dev, docs.slack.dev.

Step by step: pasted a key into ChatGPT, or committed one to GitHub.

Check before you paste

The free Chrome extension runs this check inside ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini and Perplexity before a message is sent, on your device and with no daily limit. On the web you get 5 free prompt checks a day with no account.

Add the Chrome extensionTry a free web check

Worried it is already in your code? Check a public GitHub repository free (3 checks a day).

Related

Sources